Joseph Krist

Municipal Credit Consultant

IS A P3 PUBLIC OR PRIVATE?

A recent letter from a local tax entity in Texas has raised an interesting issue with regard to the tax exempt status of student housing projects operated as public private (P3) partnerships on public lands. Brazos Central Appraisal District (“BCAD”) has requested seek an  Attorney General opinion to assist BCAD and its chief appraiser in  determining  whether  certain properties and improvements located in Brazos County, Texas are exempt  from  taxation. This request concerns two student housing  projects  on  property  owned  by  the  Texas A&M University System (“TAMUS”) in College Station, Texas. The first project described below is under  construction,  and  the  second  project  described  below  is  completed and occupied.

The District makes the case that these projects will be in competition with private  housing projects that do not enjoy tax exempt  status, and when those private projects  compete against tax exempt projects they are at a competitive disadvantage. The projects in question comprise a 3,400-bed complex with rooms ranging from studio apartments to three-bedroom,  garden-style units built on 48 acres of A&M land.

According to the District, there does not appear to be any definite restriction on the right to lease to persons other than faculty, staff and students of TAMUS or Blinn College. The lease contemplates that the facilities will be subleased to students, faculty and staff of Texas A&M, and also to students, faculty and staff of Blinn College, but it appears to permit subleases to persons who are not faculty, staff or students  of  Texas A&M or Blinn College. A&M’s agreement with the developer says that during the term of the land lease, all improvements will be owned by the developer and therefore the developer will have the legal title to those improvements.

A&M is relying on existing case law, including a 1992 case in which the court held that improvements to state land were exempt from taxation, despite the fact that the legal title to the improvements was not owned by the state. A&M maintains that “the new projects clearly serve a public purpose directly related to the University’s mission, providing housing for our students. “The concerns of local officials and local apartment owners are misplaced. The new projects are exempt from property taxes because they serve a public purpose, like the Corps of Cadets dorms and other dorms on the University campus.”

We suspect that the projects will be found to be exempt from local property taxes but the question raised is interesting and has implications for other P3 projects as well as possible challenges to property tax exemptions for other “not for profit” entities.

PUERTO RICO

On Monday, the trustee of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) filed a notice in which it warns the utility about the end, since Sept. 15, of a period in which the trustee had limited power to take such actions as sending default cure notices and impose other enforcement measures, as a result of the forbearance agreements that were in place with PREPA’s main creditor constituencies — the Ad Hoc Group of bondholders, fuel-line lenders and monoline insurers.

The trustee, U.S. Bank National Association, stated that as a result of the Sept. 15 deadline expiration, its power to send cure, or need for corrective action notices and take enforcement actions with respect to defaults is no longer limited by a requirement that called for a written request from a majority of principal holders for the trustee to act. Moreover, a temporary relief that allowed PREPA to not fulfill its obligation to transfer money “from the General Fund to the Revenue Fund has also ended.”

“The Trustee continues at this time to monitor and assess the negotiation process, and reserves all rights and remedies under the Trust Agreement, including, without limitation, the right to send cure notices and the right to pursue enforcement actions following an event of default,” the filing states.

As first reported by CARIBBEAN BUSINESS, PREPA reached an agreement with its fuel-line lenders last week to restructure about $700 million in debt held by the group of banks, which also agreed to further extend their forbearance agreement from Sept. 25 to Oct. 1. Meanwhile, the utility reached a restructuring agreement at the beginning of the month with the Ad Hoc Group that calls for an exchange of unwrapped, or uninsured, bonds for new, securitized paper; a 15% haircut, or debt reduction, on principal; and a moratorium on principal payments for the next five years, among other items. PREPA also secured an additional extension on its forbearance agreements with the Ad Hoc Group, through Oct. 1.

However, PREPA hit a snag with its other main creditor constituency, monoline insurers, when they failed to reach an agreement before negotiations hit the Sept. 25 deadline. In addition, while bond insurers Syncora and Assured Guaranty first agreed to extend their forbearance agreement with the utility from Sept. 18 until Sept. 25, MBIA Inc.’s National Public Finance Guarantee did not consent to it. National filed a petition Sept. 17 at the Puerto Rico Energy Commission (PREC), seeking a rate revision and hike of 4.2 cents per kilowatt-hour, which should take place within four months. The insurer is expecting a response from PREPA by Oct. 1, according to the document filed by the insurer at PREC.

The utility remains deadlocked with its monoline insurers, with all three currently out of their forbearance agreements with PREPA. “We continue to negotiate with our bond insurers in an effort to reach an agreement that will allow the authority to further progress in its transformation,” PREPA Chief Restructuring Officer Lisa Donahue stated after reaching the preliminary deal with fuel-line lenders. Insurers are now technically allowed to notify the trustee of a default event, putting the utility on a 30-day clock to address the issue after a notice is sent by the trustee requiring corrective action, or potentially face litigation..

The PREPA negotiations have been a litmus test of sorts, separate from the García Padilla administration’s recent announcement that it intends to restructure some $47 billion — not including PREPA and the Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority — of the commonwealth’s $72 billion debt. The commonwealth was hopeful that the financially troubled public corporation, with its outsized debt towering at $9.4 billion, could represent an example for creditors of the shape of restructuring to come.

TRYING TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS

For many of us who have observed Puerto Rico’s unwillingness to honestly face its financial failings, Tuesday’s hearing before the Senate Finance Committee was yet another example of why it is hard to take the Puerto Rican government seriously. The officials sent by that government were told once again that the numbers they were using to make their case were too incomplete to persuade lawmakers that help was warranted — or that the money would be well spent. This reflects long-held views of the municipal bond analytical community.

Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, said that while he sympathized with the island’s plight, Congress needed to know more detail about the causes and structure of its debt, and whether help from Washington would benefit it in the long run. “We’d better get the right information, or nothing’s going to be done,” Senator Hatch warned.

The officials  came before the committee to argue for changes in various federal laws, which they said currently discriminate against Puerto Rico. It occurred in the face of large debt payments due in November and December, and warnings that it will not have enough cash to pay them while still providing an acceptable level of government services. None of the officials asked explicitly for a bailout, but they said the United States had a moral duty to help Puerto Rico, and identified a number of federal laws and programs that they said were discriminatory and ought to be changed.

“I want to help you,” Mr. Hatch told them. “I don’t think Puerto Rico is treated fairly. But we have to get really good information in order to help you.” Melba Acosta Febo, the head of the Government Development Bank, told Senator Hatch that the lack of financial data reflected Puerto Rico’s antiquated computer systems, which the government wanted to replace. She promised to gather as much information for the senators as possible. Given the need for such data, one would think that some of the island’s huge debt could have financed an updated system. But yet again, Puerto Rico failed to take responsibility for their own shortcomings.

These shortcomings have been well known for a long time but have continued to go unaddressed. They affect not only Puerto Rico’s ability to generate financials that can be audited but also casts doubt as to whether the island can actually account for ongoing cash flow and develop a base of economic data to support realistic planning and execution of economic development plans.

Instead, the Puerto Ricans relied on old complaints about federal laws they considered inequitable, particularly those that govern health care for the elderly and the poor, like Medicare and Medicaid. Yes, Puerto Rico’s population is older, and considerably poorer, than the rest of the United States. Ms. Acosta estimated that amending the relevant laws would be worth an additional $1.5 billion for Puerto Rico.

Sergio M. Marxuach, policy director for the Center for a New Economy, a nonpartisan research institute in San Juan, said that the best way Washington could reduce poverty and promote growth in Puerto Rico was to extend a version of the federal earned-income tax credit program to the island. The credit is for low- and moderate-income working individuals and couples — particularly those with children. He said this could be done even though residents of Puerto Rico do not now pay federal income tax — a questionable assumption. He also acknowledged that at some point Puerto Rico’s legal status as a territory would have to be changed. That message was mixed at best.

Pedro Pierluisi, Puerto Rico’s nonvoting member of Congress, chose to take a less diplomatic route. “We should treat Puerto Rico equally,” he said. “They are fellow American citizens. You shouldn’t be looking the other way. You shouldn’t be ignoring us. If you do so, you do so at your peril.”

Interestingly, the only witness who was not from Puerto Rico, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, the former head of the Congressional Budget Office, and now president of the American Action Forum expressed skepticism that giving Puerto Rico more federal health care money would bring about the structural economic changes the island needed. “You don’t generate long-term economic growth by increasing health care spending in Puerto Rico,” said Mr. Holtz-Eakin. “You might relieve some budget pressure, but so would a check for anything else.” “The primary emphasis should be on economic growth,” rather than simply finding new sources of money, he said. This supports arguments that many have made regarding the long-term outlook for Puerto Rico.

The hearing did produce some firm statements from the GDB which will only serve to steel the resolve of general obligation bondholders in any upcoming negotiation. Senator Hatch asked the witnesses about other types of debt that Puerto Rico owes, such as its pension obligations to retired government workers. He wanted to know which had priority in the hierarchy of creditors — Puerto Rico’s general obligation bondholders, or Puerto Rico’s pensioners. He elicited a response from Ms. Acosta that affirmed that general obligation bonds have an explicit constitutional guarantee and pensions did not. “It’s a very big problem,” she added. Further, she stated that the pension system will probably run out of cash in 2018. She said that at that point Puerto Rico would have to pay retirees directly from its general fund. “This is one of the reasons that we’re saying that we have to restructure the debt,”. “The idea is to use some of that money to put into the pension plans, because they badly need it.” As was the case in Detroit, this directly pits bondholders against pensioners.

From our standpoint, it was a very poor performance from the Puerto Rico officials both strategically and tactically. At this point, the Puerto Rican government appears to be clearly outmatched and its interests are not being best served by the current cast of characters. It also raises questions about the quality of the advice it is receiving. Sadly, this is not anything new. It points to our standing belief that the restructuring process will be long and messy and not be settled anytime soon.

Disclaimer:  The opinions and statements expressed in this column are solely those of the author, who is solely responsible for the accuracy and completeness of this column.  The opinions and statements expressed on this website are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to provide investment advice or guidance in any way and do not represent a solicitation to buy, sell or hold any of the securities mentioned.  Opinions and statements expressed reflect only the view or judgment of the author(s) at the time of publication, and are subject to change without notice.  Information has been derived from sources deemed to be reliable, but the reliability of which is not guaranteed.  Readers are encouraged to obtain official statements and other disclosure documents on their own and/or to consult with their own investment professional and advisors prior to making any investment decisions.

Joseph Krist

Municipal Credit Consultant

CHICAGO BUDGET

Mayor Rahm Emmanuel announced his proposed budget for fiscal year 2016 on Tuesday. It includes a record city property tax increase ($543 million), a Chicago Public Schools construction property tax increase ($45 million), a new garbage hauling fee ($62.7 million), Uber and cabdriver tax and fee hikes ($48.6 million), new electronic cigarette taxes ($1 million) and building permit fee increases ($13 million). The city property tax hike, to be phased in over four years, would go toward the police and fire pension fund. It would amount to an estimated 70-percent increase in the city’s levy. The mayor wants state lawmakers to pass a law to exempt private homes valued at less than $250,000. The CPS money goes to the school district. The rest of the money goes toward reducing the year-to-year operating deficit, also known as the structural deficit.

The sharp increase in payments to the pension funds has been looming over the City for some time. Now that the actual numbers required have been made public, the issue becomes a political one. The City Council has avoided these kinds of increases for a long as possible but it has become clear that the State’s own pension and  difficulties preclude any real current help from that source. Emmanuel will have to obtain the votes of 26 of the 51 council alderman. The property tax increase may actually be the least contentious item if the homestead exemption is allowed. The garbage fee will actually be politically more difficult.

According to the Mayor, cutting its way to find the money for increasing pension payments would cause the City to cut 2,500 police officers, or about 20 percent of the force. He also said 48 fire stations — about half the city’s total — would have to be shut down while laying off 2,000 firefighters, or 40 percent of the department. Even if he wins approval of all the tax hikes, Emanuel’s $7.8 billion budget proposal comes with a measure of risk. It counts on Republican Gov. Bruce Rauner not standing in the way of legislation, supported by the Democratic legislative leadership,  that gives Chicago more leeway on required increases in police and fire pension payments. If that bill is not enacted, the city could find itself $219 million in the hole next year. The uncertainty over the outlook for the proposed budget continues to pressure the City’s ratings and supports the continuing maintenance of the current negative ratings outlooks.

PREPA RESTRUCTURING

The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) announced Saturday morning that it secured extensions on its forbearance agreements with the Ad Hoc Group through Oct. 1, and fuel-line lenders through Sept. 25. Although monoline bond insurers, the public corporation’s other main creditor constituency, are not parties to the extension agreements, they continue to engage in discussions with PREPA and other creditors, according to the utility. “We are making progress and will continue working toward a consensual resolution that benefits PREPA and all of its stakeholders,” said Lisa Donahue, PREPA chief restructuring officer.

Without an agreement with the monoline insurers ahead of the deadline, they are technically allowed to notify PREPA’s trustee of a default event, which would commence a 30-day cure period, or potentially face litigation. Supposedly, the utility believes it will not end up in litigation with its bond insurers, which along with the Ad Hoc Group and the fuel-line lenders are PREPA’s three main creditor constituencies.

PREPA’s fuel-line creditors, a group of banks, and the Ad Hoc Group, which holds about 35% of the utility’s $9 billion debt, were willing to grant the forbearance agreement extensions Friday. Monoline insurers continued to hold out. At the beginning of the month, MBIA Inc.’s National Public Finance Guarantee chose not to join the other forbearing creditors in granting the deadline extension.

Meanwhile, the preliminary agreement reached between the utility and the Ad Hoc Group is said to call for an exchange of uninsured bonds for new, securitized paper; a 15% haircut on principal; and a moratorium on principal payments for the next five years, among other items. National is exposed to approximately $1.4 billion on PREPA. The utility’s other monoline backers, Assured and Syncora, insured about $900 million and $170 million, respectively, according to Bloomberg. National has a total exposure of some $5 billion across the commonwealth.

The way this deal [with the Ad Hoc Group] is structured is said to be viewed as being punitive to National relative to Assured in that National has a lot of front-ended maturities. The cost to National is about twice what the cost is to Assured, even on an equal dollar basis. Even on something that they both have $100 worth of exposure to, the cost to National is about $30 and the cost to Assured is about $15 on a present value basis.  The commonwealth has hoped a PREPA workout could be a template  for creditors in the overall restructuring to come.

The utility still faces significant hurdles before it can successfully complete a consensual restructuring plan, among them securing participation of at least 75% of bondholders that have not previously been part of the yearlong restructuring talks. Also, legislation is required for many of the plan’s components — including approval for the debt-exchange procedure and changes to PREPA’s governance provisions.  Securing majority support from the Legislature has proven to be difficult at best in many instances for the García Padilla administration.

SANTA ROSA BRIDGE

One of the best examples of a deal that could only be done in the muni market has always been bonds issued for the Santa Rosa Bay Bridge near Pensacola FL. The bridge was built in 1999 primarily to support real estate development on Santa Rosa Island on Florida’s Gulf Coast. “Bo’s Bridge” as it was known in the area, was driven primarily by support from its biggest backer, former House Speaker Bolley “Bo” Johnson. It remains a prime example of speculative investment backed by poor research by both the consultant and bond investor communities. Usage has never met projections and underutilization along with demand diminishing toll increases have combined to produce a facility which will likely never cover its debt service. Coverage shortfalls have characterized the credit since 2010.

The bridge is now back in the news with a move by the Trustee for the bonds to initiate litigation against the FL DOT. Representatives of Trustee’s counsel and a project consultant met with State Representative Doug Broxson (Santa Rosa) to discuss potential resolutions to the situation in November, 2014 and February, 2015. Neither of the meetings were successful. On March 16, 2015, the Trustee notified FDOT of the Authority’s noncompliance with the Bond Resolution, and demanded that FDOT immediately implement a toll schedule recommended by the project toll consultant. In May, 2015, FDOT’s general counsel sent a response r that posed numerous questions to the Trustee and also requested additional items that the Trustee will not be able to provide. These included a request for indemnification by the Trustee of FDOT from individual Bondholders’ claims that, following the requested adjustment to tolls, cause revenues to either decline or remain insufficient to timely pay debt service on the Bonds and to fully meet all other requirements of the Resolution. Trustee’s counsel responded to FDOT, reiterating that FDOT is contractually required to raise tolls, and requesting that FDOT raise the rates.

The Trustee has now notified bondholders that it is willing to file suit against FDOT provided it receives direction and satisfactory indemnity against the costs, expenses and liabilities, including attorneys’ fees and expenses from Bondholders that may be incurred as a result of such litigation. Bondholders representing not less than a majority in aggregate principal amount of the Bonds Outstanding would have to approve the litigation. Without Bondholder support, the Trustee is unwilling to file suit against FDOT given the costs of such litigation and the potential damage to Bondholders who are satisfied with the partial debt service payments currently being disbursed to Bondholders.

When the financing was done in 1996, it was clear that it had been structured so that all of the risk of shortfalls in use and revenues would be borne by the bondholders. Many investors felt that despite the lack of any guarantees, the State would ultimately step in and pay debt service. We do not see what has changed to make the State of Florida suddenly decide that it should take on responsibility for payment of the bonds.

TEXAS WATER

The State Water Board will issue its first series of bonds under its SWIFT program. SWIFT finances the purchase of obligations from local water systems secured by either their general obligation or revenue pledge. Pledged revenue bonds would be secured by one year of reserves and required annual coverage. The Board has been funded with a $2 billion appropriation by the Texas legislature under voter approved constitutional changes. It differs from existing state revolving fund bonds in that there are no federal dollars involved in funding the pool of money available to be lent.

The program is designed to help local communities develop new water resources to meet growing water needs to support new development which is occurring at a rapid pace. The pooled nature of the borrowing and the high credit ratings obtained through the proposed structure are intended to achieve the lowest possible financing cost for the underlying borrowers.

The Board will make subsidized low interest loans, deferred interest loans, and financings accomplished through board ownership of projects which will then be sold back over long-term schedules to the underlying local agency. Loans may be substituted as appropriate.  The portfolio was structured and secured in such a way as to obtain a program rating of triple A. Those ratings have been obtained from Fitch and S&P.

Disclaimer:  The opinions and statements expressed in this column are solely those of the author, who is solely responsible for the accuracy and completeness of this column.  The opinions and statements expressed on this website are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to provide investment advice or guidance in any way and do not represent a solicitation to buy, sell or hold any of the securities mentioned.  Opinions and statements expressed reflect only the view or judgment of the author(s) at the time of publication, and are subject to change without notice.  Information has been derived from sources deemed to be reliable, but the reliability of which is not guaranteed.  Readers are encouraged to obtain official statements and other disclosure documents on their own and/or to consult with their own investment professional and advisors prior to making any investment decisions.

Joseph Krist

Municipal Credit Consultant

CA FINANCES OFF TO STRONG START

The State Controller has released results for the first two months of the State’s fiscal year. Strong August numbers pushed overall receipts for the 2015-16 fiscal year to $674.7 million, or 5.0 percent, above projections. For the fiscal year to date, all three major sources of revenue are surpassing expectations. August receipts were$1.5 billion higher than a year ago, and year-to-date receipts $1.9 billion higher. August retail sales and use tax revenues of $3.1 billion beat those from a year ago by 36.7 percent, while personal income tax revenue of $4.2 billion came in 6 percent higher, and corporation tax revenue of $159.1 million was 26.2 percent higher. The state ended the month of August with unused borrowable resources of $29.8 billion, which is 10.1 percent more than anticipated. This year, because of the state’s improved fiscal position, the Controller anticipates internal borrowing will be sufficient to meet cash flow without having to issue revenue anticipation notes (RANs). In 2013, California issued a $5.5 billion RAN with an 11- month term. In the next year, the state borrowed $2.8 billion from private investors for roughly nine months.

ILLINOIS IN MONTH THREE WITHOUT A BUDGET

Nearly four dozen state-funded social service programs have been denied state tax dollars in the midst of the budget impasse, some of which report being near the point of having to close their doors. Among them: After school programs for teens, early childhood intervention, autism assistance, domestic violence shelters and services, funeral and burial services for the poor, and programs to help parents prevent Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. These entities are a share of the 10% of state spending don’t have a law or court order to keep their funding flowing. Even with federal money making its way to some programs, it’s not enough to fund the services. Domestic violence programs, for example, are 91% unfunded because they don’t have access to state funding. Fortunately, state debt service is included in the 90% of state spending which is able to be maintained even without an enacted budget. This may account for the lack of real alarm from bondholders about the state’s seemingly intractable budget impasse.

SEATTLE SCHOOLS

While the State legislature continues to try to figure out how to meet state court funding mandates for education, After four months of negotiations, a five-day strike and one final all-night talk, the Seattle teachers union and Seattle Public Schools reached a tentative contract agreement early Tuesday, and school is scheduled to start Thursday for the city’s 53,000 students. It was the first strike by Seattle teachers in some 30 years.

The Seattle Education Association’s board of directors and its elected building representatives both voted Tuesday afternoon to suspend the strike, after four months of negotiations, a five-day strike and one final all-night talk, recommending the union’s membership approve the deal. The agreement will go to a full vote of the union’s 5,000 members at a Sunday meeting.

PENNSYLVAIA BUDGET

Pa. Senate Republicans are trying to force a vote on a stopgap budget which would eliminate about a third of the funding that was included in the GOP-passed $30.2 billion budget that Gov. Wolf vetoed in its entirety on June 30. That would provide temporary relief to social service agencies and school districts that have laid off staff, curtailed some services and put off paying bills while awaiting a budget agreement. The plan is to call for a vote to move a stopgap budget bill out of the appropriations committee on Wednesday to set up a vote by the full chamber on Friday.

A simple majority of the votes is required to gain passage and send the bill to the House for consideration. The Republican-controlled House returns to session next Monday and plans to begin its consideration of the stopgap proposal. The House rules would allow that chamber to consider it for final passage by Wednesday, at the earliest. The Governor could then  veto it, sign it, or use his line-item veto authority and veto only certain budgetary lines.

NORTH CAROLINA

Its history of conservative and strong financial operations has allowed North Carolina’s lack of a budget for the biennium which began July 1 to fly under the radar. So investors may be surprised to find out the State legislature is just getting around to approving a budget. After 11 weeks without one, the State Senate approved a budget which includes a cut in marginal income tax rates but increase in sales taxes through an expansion of the items subject to the tax to cover repairs, maintenance and installations. Division of Motor Vehicles fees also would rise. On the spending side, the plan spends barely 3 percent more than last year, with much of the increase going to the public schools and the University of North Carolina system. All teachers and state employees get $750 bonuses.

PRASA SETTLES WITH U.S. EPA

In the midst of efforts to restructure its already troubled finances, the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) has agreed to make major upgrades, improve inspections and cleaning of existing facilities within its Puerto Nuevo system and continue improvements to its systems island-wide, according to an announcement from the U.S. Justice Department. The sewer system serves the municipalities of San Juan, Trujillo Alto, and portions of Bayamón, Guaynabo and Carolina. It updates existing agreements reached in 2004, 2006 and 2010. The improvements will supplement projects already being implemented under the previous settlements including construction of infrastructure at wastewater treatment and sludge treatment systems, as well as the Puerto Nuevo collection system.

In recognition of the financial conditions in Puerto Rico, the U.S. government waived the payment of civil penalties associated with violations alleged in the complaint filed Tuesday. “These upgrades are urgently needed to reduce the public’s exposure to serious health risks posed by untreated sewage,” said the Justice Department’s Environment and Natural Resources Division. “The United States has taken Puerto Rico’s financial hardship into account by prioritizing the most critical projects first, and allowing a phased-in approach in other areas, but … these requirements are necessary for the long-term health and safety of San Juan area residents.”

Violations include releases of untreated sewage and other pollutants into waterways in the San Juan area including the San Juan Bay, Condado Lagoon, Martín Peña Canal and the Atlantic Ocean. These releases have been in violation of PRASA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits and the Clean Water Act. PRASA also violated its NPDES permit by failing to report discharges in the Puerto Nuevo collection system and by failing to meet effluent limitations and operations and maintenance obligations at numerous facilities island-wide.

Under the agreement, PRASA will spend approximately $1.5 billion to make necessary improvements. The utility will undertake a comprehensive operation and maintenance program in the Puerto Nuevo sanitary sewer system, including conducting an analysis of the system to determine whether subsequent investments must be made to ensure the system is brought into legal compliance and to conduct immediate repairs at specific areas of concern. PRASA has also agreed to invest $120 million to construct sanitary sewers that will serve communities surrounding the Martín Peña Canal, a project that will benefit approximately 20,000 people.

The settlement is subject to a 30-day public comment period and approval by the federal court.

PUERTO RICO PLAN ALREADY UNDER ASSAULT

The battle has begun in reaction to the Puerto Rican government’s plan to restructure all of its debt, including general obligations. There are already two competing analyses which have been made public, at least on a limited basis, which call into question many of the government plan specifics. These questions question many of the economic assumptions relied on by the government as well as the absolute level of cash shortfalls to be realized over the plan’s five year time horizon. A Virginia-based group called Main Street Bondholders accused the governor on Wednesday of distorting the island’s financial situation.

The reaction sets the stage for a protracted battle between the government and its creditors as well as one between the government and its employees and taxpayers. The politics of the restructuring are a minefield of competing and somewhat mutually exclusive interests and past history shows that reliance on political will provides a shaky foundation at best for belief that a resolution will be relatively quick. That belief is rooted in the recent statement by the Governor when he said that if Puerto Rico’s creditors would not negotiate concessions, he would have to execute the five-year plan without them. Legislators from both the opposition and the governor’s own party said this week that the plan does not have the votes needed to be adopted, especially provisions that call for slashing the budget of the island’s largest public university by one-third and imposing a 10-year waiver from future minimum wage increases for young workers.

Disclaimer:  The opinions and statements expressed in this column are solely those of the author, who is solely responsible for the accuracy and completeness of this column.  The opinions and statements expressed on this website are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to provide investment advice or guidance in any way and do not represent a solicitation to buy, sell or hold any of the securities mentioned.  Opinions and statements expressed reflect only the view or judgment of the author(s) at the time of publication, and are subject to change without notice.  Information has been derived from sources deemed to be reliable, but the reliability of which is not guaranteed.  Readers are encouraged to obtain official statements and other disclosure documents on their own and/or to consult with their own investment professional and advisors prior to making any investment decisions.

Joseph Krist

Municipal Credit Consultant

PUERTO RICO – STILL HAVEN’T FOUND WHAT WE’RE LOOKING FOR

An independent financial control board will be tasked with ensuring that the recently released Fiscal & Economic Growth Plan (FEGP), once approved, is followed. It would comprise “experienced individuals from inside and outside the commonwealth,” according to an executive summary of the FEGP, with most of its members selected from a list that will not be determined by the government. It assumes that it would have the necessary powers to ensure compliance, particularly if subsequent administrations decide to do away with the final plan. The board would have the authority to approve the plan, as well as the power to force budgetary cuts, among other corrective actions that will be part of draft legislation submitted to allow for its establishment. It has yet to be revealed when the Economic Recovery Working Group will deliver its proposed legislation to Puerto Rico lawmakers for their necessary approval.

The board will oversee new budgetary regulations and practices, pursuant to a proposed law that would be known as the Fiscal Responsibility & Economic Revitalization Act. Constitutional questions have surrounded this topic since the group first began its work back in July. Legislation to this effect would have to be thoroughly analyzed to ensure it doesn’t infringe on the commonwealth’s Constitution and the delegation of powers.

Puerto Rico’s government will also need to get help from Washington, D.C., with many of the plan’s critical aspects depending heavily on federal action, as the commonwealth attempts to achieve economic growth and solve its fiscal woes. The plan again highlights the commonwealth’s lack of an orderly procedure to restructure its liabilities.

To control healthcare costs, the plan urges for parity in Medicare and Medicaid funding from the federal government. The FEGP recommends a long list of initiatives that would provide the commonwealth with equal treatment under both federal programs, allowing the local government to control healthcare costs.

Commonwealth efforts to achieve budget balance include extension until FY 2021 the Act 66 of2014’s freeze of new hires, formula-based appropriations, service costs, increase in salaries and collective bargaining agreements although the impact does not include the negative effect on Additional Uniform Contribution to the public pension systems. To reduce payroll costs the Commonwealth would implement a 2% annual attrition target. To achieve the attrition target, the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) may offer early retirement window to selected public sector employees. The Commonwealth may use a portion of the proceeds of P3 initiatives to incentivize voluntary retirement.

The FEGP calls for legislation to, beginning FY 2018, gradually adjust subsidies provided to municipalities by the central government, while empowering municipalities with the proper legal, administrative and operational tools for them to offset such decrease. The Commonwealth proposes significant changes to the funding scheme for the University of Puerto Rico in order to reduce the general fund subsidy requirement.

Much has been made of the demands from certain creditor groups to reduce education spending. This reflects the facts that since 1980, enrollment at public schools has declined 41% and, due to demographic trends, it is expected to fall an additional 25% (317,000 students) by 2020. This decline has led to a reduction in school utilization and a decrease in the student to teacher ratio to 12:1 (US average is 16:1). The Commonwealth proposes reduction of the  PRDE payroll through 2% attrition.

Other Commonwealth actions include proposals to concession remaining toll roads, including PR-20, PR-52 and PR-66 as well as maritime transport and bus system operations. These include 5-year minimum concession agreement for the operation and maintenance of the public maritime transportation services.

Several efforts will be made  to encourage Congress to provide Puerto Rico with tax treatment that encourages US investment on the island, such as the amendment of the US Internal Revenue Code to add new Section 933A to permit US-owned businesses in Puerto Rico to elect to be treated as US domestic corporations; enactment of  an economic activity tax credit for US investment in Puerto Rico designed as a targeted, cost-efficient version of former Section 936 of the US Internal Revenue Code; and in the event the US moves towards a territorial taxation system, exempt Puerto Rico from base erosion and/or minimum tax measures.

Other Federal action that could provide short-term impact include financing from the Department of Energy for the Aguirre Offshore GasPort project and finalizing its federal permit process; Federal Aviation Administration approval for airport consolidations; and technical assistance from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Census Bureau, National Agricultural Statistical Service and Build America Transportation Investment Center.

The plan will also need an extension of the ruling that allows manufacturing companies that pay the Act 154 excise tax to deduct it against federal taxes. Successfully achieving an extension will allow the Puerto Rico government to extend the 4% tax until December 2017, after which it would be replaced by a “modified source income rule tax.” The large share of the island’s General Fund revenue comes from the levy, accounting for about 20%.

The plan’s base-case scenario assumes approximately -1% real growth in GNP while the high-growth scenario assumes structural reforms lead to GNP growth of 2% by 2020 (2% inflation is assumed in both cases). In the end however, the plan comes up short in terms of providing for sustainable budgetary balance. The government estimates a $ 27.8 billion cumulative financing gap over five years but 27.8 billion cumulative financing gap even after full implementation of the plan the proposed initiatives, together with economic growth, are expected to reduce the five-year financing gap by only about $13.8 billion, when taking into account $2.5 billion in incremental costs of the measures.

As for the Commonwealth’s debts, here is what the report concludes. “As difficult as debt restructuring is likely to be, the Working Group has instructed its advisors to begin working on a voluntary exchange offer to be made to its creditors as part of the implementation of the Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan  In the design of the voluntary exchange offer, the Working Group has directed its advisors to take into account the priority accorded to various debt instruments across the Puerto Rico debt complex, including its GO debt, while recognizing that, even assuming the clawback of revenues supporting certain Commonwealth tax-supported debt, available resources may be insufficient to service all principal and interest on debt that has a constitutional priority  Therefore, a consensual compromise of the creditors’ competing claims to the Commonwealth’s revenues to support debt service will be required in order to avoid a destabilizing default on the Commonwealth’s debt and to avoid a legal morass that will further destabilize the Commonwealth’s economy and finances  Accordingly, the Working Group has directed its advisors to meet with the creditor groups that have already been organized (and those that may be formed hereafter) to explain the Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan and to begin negotiation of the terms of a voluntary exchange offer that can garner widespread creditor acceptance  It is the Working Group’s belief that a voluntary adjustment of the terms of the Commonwealth’s debt that allows the measures contained in the FEGP to be implemented is the best way to maximize all creditor recoveries.”

Undermining the statements about voluntary exchanges is the Commonwealth’s announcement on Wednesday of its long-awaited debt restructuring proposal. The plan does not include the debt payments of its electric utility and its water and sewer authority which are being handled separately. Nor did they include debts structured without any payments due in the next five years. That leaves DEBT with a face value of some $47 billion. Five years’ worth of interest and principal payments on them is estimated at $18 billion. These include Puerto Rico’s general obligation bonds, which were sold to investors with an explicit constitutional promise that timely repayment would take priority over all other expenditures on the island.

The restructuring would provide $13 billion to finish paying for government services over the coming five years, which would leave just $5 billion for the bondholders over that period. It was not detailed how they thought this might be divided among the different classes of debt. Creditors are expected to get a more detailed set of cash-flow projections from the working group and form negotiating groups of their own over the next few weeks, according to the types of debt they hold. Then the negotiations over altering the repayment are expected to begin.

One way or another, it is clear that the Commonwealth is likely relying on both a reduction and an extension of its debt repayment schedule to finance itself. We continue to believe that this will lead to a protracted and uncertain process which can and should hamper the Commonwealth’s ability to access needed capital financing in the public debt markets.

KENTUCKY DOWNGRADE TO A PLUS

Standard & Poor’s downgraded Kentucky’s debt and credit rating last Thursday, citing the enormous and growing unfunded liabilities of its public pensions plans, as well as the lack of commitment by the state’s elected officials to do anything about it. The rating was lowered from AA- to A+. S&P said, “the downgrade reflects our view of Kentucky’s substantially underfunded pension liabilities that are the result of chronic underfunding and that we view as placing long-term pressures on the state’s finances. Despite pension reform efforts that began in 2008, Kentucky lawmakers have yet to make meaningful progress in reducing its long-term pension liability, especially as it relates to Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System (KTRS). Although pension reform was discussed in the 2015 legislative session, the session ended without a resolution on how to address  KTRS’ large unfunded liability.”

The estimated combined $48 billion of unfunded liabilities for both pension systems is the equivalent of $12,000 for every man, woman and child in the state.

DETROIT SCHOOLS CONTINUE TO BLEED

In communities with large numbers of charter schools, legacy school districts struggle with declining enrollments that can lead to school closings and leave the remaining schools with students who often are the most difficult to educate. One such example is the Detroit Public Schools. Population declines and the availability of charter schools have reduced revenues distributed to it on a per pupil basis. This has made it more difficult for the DPS to balance its operations and reduced available funds for debt service.

As a result, Standard & Poor’s Rating Service announced its downgrade of two series of long-term bonds issued by the Michigan Finance Authority for DPS. S&P lowered the rating on 2011 revenue bonds to “A” from “A+” while 2012 revenue bonds dropped to “A-” from “A+.” This even though the bonds are pledged to be repaid from state aid to the schools, with the money passing each month directly from the state to a trustee charged with making the bond payments.

WASHINGTON STATE SCHOOL FUNDING

Washington State’s highest court declared last week that much of the law underpinning new charter schools around the state was unconstitutional. The court set a 20-day clock, at which time the charter system could be dismantled — a step that legal experts said no other state court had ever taken. The failure to enact school funding reform was already a huge budget and political issue. The panel that struck down the charter law, last month began assessing $100,000 a day in fines on the state until the Legislature comes up with a plan to better fund the K-12 system as a whole. Some teachers unions, including Seattle’s — the state’s biggest system — have been threatening to strike over issues of pay and staffing. Classes are scheduled to start on Wednesday in Seattle.

The court ruled that under the state Constitution, charter schools had to be run by a locally elected school board because they are operated with public money. The Washington court defined public schools in a unique way — the court cited in particular a 1909 legal precedent requiring that schools be governed by locally elected school boards —other states.

In the initial schools case, McCleary et al v. Washington, which led to the order last month on fines, the court said years of underfunding had created a patchwork of rich and poor, with some districts better able to raise taxes and money for their schools than others. The court said it would put the $700,000 a week in contempt-order fines assessed on the state into an education fund and keep collecting the money until a new plan was approved.

In its new ruling on the second case, League of Women Voters of Washington et al v. State of Washington et al, the court said that public funding and local control were intertwined and enshrined in Washington law and that privately run charter school boards did not constitute that elected control. “The fiscal impact of the initiative was merely to shift existing school funding from existing (common) schools to charter schools,” the court said.

One option under consideration if the State Legislature does not address the issue soon, is to treat the charter schools as extensions of home school, allowing students to continue in their current schedules and classes while issues of money were sorted out.

Disclaimer:  The opinions and statements expressed in this column are solely those of the author, who is solely responsible for the accuracy and completeness of this column.  The opinions and statements expressed on this website are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to provide investment advice or guidance in any way and do not represent a solicitation to buy, sell or hold any of the securities mentioned.  Opinions and statements expressed reflect only the view or judgment of the author(s) at the time of publication, and are subject to change without notice.  Information has been derived from sources deemed to be reliable, but the reliability of which is not guaranteed.  Readers are encouraged to obtain official statements and other disclosure documents on their own and/or to consult with their own investment professional and advisors prior to making any investment decisions.

Joseph Krist

Municipal Credit Consultant

It was a mixed week for Puerto Rico.

DEBT PLAN DELAYED

Investors were disappointed when it was announced at the start of the week that Puerto Rico’s long awaited overall debt restructuring proposal was to be delayed for one week until September 8. We viewed the announcement with some suspicion when the delay was attributed to the impact of Tropical Storm Erika. It seemed to be just another in a long line of missteps by the government in its effort to cope with its mountain of “unpayable debt”. The decision made more sense in light of later events.

PRASA

The Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority announced Monday it had secured an extension until Sept. 15 on a $90 million credit-line payment due Aug. 31 to Banco Popular. As a part of the deal, Bank of America will assume $75 million of this debt beginning Sept. 15, with payment due Nov. 31. Popular will keep the remaining $15 million.

In a release the Authority said “PRASA achieved an extension of the $90 million credit facility maturing Aug. 31. It will run until Sept. 15 with Banco Popular, and thereafter with Bank of America, until Nov. 30. Bank of America will acquire about $75 million, while Popular will keep about $15 million.

The utility’s initial plan was to pay the $90 million credit line to Popular with part of the $750 million bond deal PRASA had to effectively cancel due to high uncertainty in the minds of investors. These included the government’s looming deadlines to deliver the five-year fiscal stability & economic development plan, and a consensus restructuring plan between the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) and its creditors.

The Authority went on to say “This extension will allow the corporation to continue its process of accessing financial markets for the issuance of up to $750 million in bonds, through which we will be able to meet the payment of this credit line and other obligations, as well as the capital improvement plan on agenda.

After the utility was unable to close the $750 million bond deal, PRASA Executive President Alberto Lázaro had said PRASA would wait until the beginning of September to make another attempt at closing the deal, particularly after several of the uncertainty factors surrounding it had cleared.

Technically, the bond issuance is in a day-to-day status, which means it is waiting for the right time to go to market. Other external, but pending, issues before the issuance include the conclusion of negotiations with PREPA bondholders and the release of the commonwealth’s fiscal adjustment plan report. Once these issues are clearer, PREPA will be better positioned to sell its bonds in the market, according to PRASA’s statement.

If the utility had failed to get the credit-line extension, it could have been forced to tap its rate-stabilizer operational fund, something that, according to Lázaro, is being avoided since it could trigger a sooner-than-expected water rate hike.

PREPA RESTRUCTURING

Puerto Rico announced that it had agreed on terms for restructuring up to $5.7 billion of bonds late Tuesday, even though its plans to propose a much broader debt moratorium remained delayed. The restructuring plan covers only the uninsured bonds of PREPA. Its outstanding bonds have a total face value of about $8.1 billion, but of that, about $2.4 billion are insured and not part of the agreement.

The main party to the agreement was The Ad Hoc Group owns about $4.5 billion in Puerto Rico debt and comprises more than 30 funds, such as BlueMountain Capital Management, Franklin Advisors, Oppenheimer and Knighthead, among others. The group includes some who had been considered most likely to litigate.

The Ad Hoc Group will exchange all of its outstanding power revenue bonds for new securitization notes and receive 85% of their existing bond claims in new securitization bonds, which must receive an investment grade rating.  Bondholders will have the option to receive securitization bonds that will pay cash interest at a rate of 4.0% – 4.75% (depending on the rating obtained) (“Option A Bonds”) or convertible capital appreciation securitization bonds that will accrete interest at a rate of 4.5% – 5.5% for the first five years and pay current interest in cash thereafter (“Option B Bonds”).

Option A Bonds will pay interest only for the first five years, and Option B Bonds will accrete interest but not receive any cash interest during the first five years.  All uninsured bondholders will have an opportunity to participate in the exchange.  Ad Hoc Group will negotiate with PREPA in good faith to backstop a financing that will allow PREPA to conduct a cash tender for bonds held by non-forbearing creditors.

Melba Acosta Febo, president of Puerto Rico’s Government Development Bank, called the deal “an example of the promising results that can be achieved when the commonwealth and its creditors work together.” The agreement calls for an exchange of debt, according to press accounts. Current bondholders are to accept new bonds with a par value 15 percent less than the bonds they now hold. At the same time, the new bonds are to be backed by a securitized stream of revenue that is intended to make them much safer and likelier to repay investors than PREPA’s current bonds.

The planned new bonds are also intended to cost PREPA less in interest. The bonds have not yet been rated, but the securitization is supposed to make them so much stronger that they could have a coupon rate somewhere between 4 and 5 percent. The terms also call for a portion of the new bonds to pay only interest — no principal — for the first five years, to help PREPA conserve its cash. An Ad Hoc counterproposal carried a lower average interest rate of 4.11% versus PREPA’s proposal of 5.45%, depends on securitization of debt, guaranteed by 2 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of PREPA’s electricity rate, which would go to a repayment fund.

The agreement assumes participation from 75% of uninsured bondholders outside the Ad Hoc Group, is forecasted to reduce PREPA’s total debt principal by approximately $670 million, save more than $700 million in principal and interest payments over the next five years and substantially reduce PREPA’s interest rate expense on the exchanged bond debt. In addition to its agreement with the Ad Hoc Group, PREPA announced an extension of its forbearance agreements through Sept. 18. All of the creditors that were parties to the existing forbearance agreements agreed to the extension other than National Public Finance Guarantee Corp.

The announcement that PREPA had an agreement with a big block of its creditors gives Puerto Rico a needed positive step in its effort to deal with its debt. The government is likely to use the PREPA agreement  something to show to other creditors the merits of negotiating consensual restructurings instead of litigating and insisting on full payment.

GDB MOVES FORWARD ON RESTRUCTURING

Press reports indicate that the GDB is taking initial steps towards a restructuring of some of its obligations as it faces continuing liquidity issues. The GDB is reported to be entering into nondisclosure agreements with some of its creditors, as the bank aims to begin debt-restructuring negotiations and raise capital. Talks would reportedly begin as soon as Sept. 8 — the same day the Puerto Rico government expects to deliver the delayed  five-year fiscal stability & economic development plan.  An exchange of GDB notes has been mentioned by government officials as one of the most sought-after measures to bring in liquidity to the government to secure its operations beyond November.  The GDB is said to have drafted a nondisclosure agreement for creditor group being represented by law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell and advised by Ducera Partners. The group includes such firms as Avenue Capital Management, Brigade Capital Management, Candlewood Investment Group and Fir Tree Partners.

Disclaimer:  The opinions and statements expressed in this column are solely those of the author, who is solely responsible for the accuracy and completeness of this column.  The opinions and statements expressed on this website are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to provide investment advice or guidance in any way and do not represent a solicitation to buy, sell or hold any of the securities mentioned.  Opinions and statements expressed reflect only the view or judgment of the author(s) at the time of publication, and are subject to change without notice.  Information has been derived from sources deemed to be reliable, but the reliability of which is not guaranteed.  Readers are encouraged to obtain official statements and other disclosure documents on their own and/or to consult with their own investment professional and advisors prior to making any investment decisions.

Joseph Krist

Municipal Credit Consultant

WHY WE WOULD NOT BUY PRASA

The abandonment of a current sale of $750 million of revenue bonds may finally show the municipal bond market saying enough is enough to Puerto Rico. Initially the sale was delayed until this week ostensibly to give more investors time to absorb new information and better “understand” the credit. A supplement to the preliminary statement for the issue was then released. After reviewing all of the documentation, we believe that the case against buying PRASA debt is even stronger.

We have previously covered our concerns about the Authority’s unwillingness to provide adequate ongoing financial disclosure. We see this as being very important given our concerns about the Authority’s ability to service its own debt as well as uncertainties about the level of insulation that exists for Authority debt holders from the Commonwealth’s overall debt problems.

In connection with the postponement of the sale, the GDB went out of its way to say that PRASA has no need to avail itself of pending legislation permitting the Authority to restructure its debts. At the same time, the supplement to the preliminary official statement makes clear that ” the Commonwealth’s three major public utilities, which provide electricity, water , and roads for its citizens, have a combined debt of some$20 billion which they cannot pay. The final nail in the coffin was the move by Puerto Rico to appeal a ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court that prevents the agency from reorganizing under Chapter 9. The petition said that it needed to have a legal framework in case PRASA’s debts have to be restructured.

The government assumes that if PRASA meets its financial projections that it will not have to restructure. But the supplemental disclosure also details the limits on debt service costs through interest rate limits of 12% and limits on the size of annual rate increases. All of these should be red flags for potential investors (and some speculators) in the debt of the Authority. It also details potential hurdles to the use of acceleration as a tool for debt holders if the pending legislation survives ultimate judicial review.

PRASA’s senior bonds are secured by a first lien on the gross revenues of the authority. Under the Master Agreement of Trust (MAT), authority revenues flow to a trustee-held account from which monthly transfers are made to the bonds’ debt service funds. Only after the required amounts have been set aside for debt service do funds become available for PRASA’S operating expenses and other purposes. The MAT also requires the authority to manage its debt burden and service rates such that gross revenues will cover maximum annual debt service by at least 2.5 times. The bonds will be issued under New York State law, with the exception of any provisions related to receivership.

The gross lien pledge is offset by two factors. One, is that the utility must operate to generate revenues and those expenses have to be covered. Second is that overhanging all of this is the fact that currently, there just is not enough water to meet demand. There are already significant water use restrictions and effective rationing in place and there is no way to determine when the highly unfavorable climate conditions will end.

We think that investors should be exactly that – investors – in municipal bonds. If one wants to gamble in Puerto Rico, then go visit and play in one of the island’s casinos. Last time we looked, its municipal bonds were not available through casinos.

VA. TO TRY P3 HIGHWAY FINANCING AGAIN

Virginia will attempt another P3 development of a major highway project after earlier unsuccessful ventures. This project is the Transform66 Outside the Beltway Project designed to address congestion near the District of Columbia in northern Virginia. The project would cost $2.1 billion and has been certified for approval.

Under the proposed plan, I-66 would be improved to provide three regular lanes in each direction, two express lanes in each direction, high-frequency bus service with predictable travel times, and direct access between the express lanes and new or expanded commuter lots. The proposed express lanes would be dynamically-priced toll lanes that are designed to provide a reliable, faster trip. Drivers traveling with three or more occupants would be considered high occupancy vehicles, and could use the express lanes for free at any time.

By the end of 2016, the team is working to complete environmental work and begin construction in 2017. VDOT will decide between three options. A toll revenue concession – similar to the 495 and 95 Express lanes, in which the state would make a public contribution, but the private entity would take the risk in financing, designing, building, operating and maintaining the project; a design-build-operate-maintain project where the state would finance the project and collect the toll revenues, but the private sector would take the risk in designing, building, operating and maintaining the project, or a design-build-alternative technical concepts project where the state would finance the project, collect toll revenues as well as operate and maintain the project while the private sector would take the risk in designing and building the project and be able to come up with engineering savings during the bidding process, which cannot be done  currently under a typical design-build project.

Under any scenario chosen, a toll revenue concession – similar to the 495 and 95 Express lanes, in which the state would make a public contribution, the private entity would take the risk in financing, designing, building, operating and maintaining the project.

PA. BUDGET IMPASSE DRAGS ON

Pennsylvania House Republicans failed in their unprecedented attempt to partially override Governor Wolf’s eight week old veto of the state budget. Democrats, including Governor Wolf, declared unconstitutional the effort to override the veto on a selective line by line basis. The stunt-like effort reflected a view on the part of some Republicans expressed by one member who said “it shouldn’t matter” if the move was not legal or sustainable.

The effort reflected pressure on legislators to maintain funding for certain programs like human service agencies whose programs are supported by recipients of many political stripes. The lack of a budget and spending authorization is beginning to pinch those providers. The process remains mired in the dispute over efforts to increase taxes, impose new taxes on the natural gas industry, and increase education funding by the Commonwealth.

Disclaimer:  The opinions and statements expressed in this column are solely those of the author, who is solely responsible for the accuracy and completeness of this column.  The opinions and statements expressed on this website are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to provide investment advice or guidance in any way and do not represent a solicitation to buy, sell or hold any of the securities mentioned.  Opinions and statements expressed reflect only the view or judgment of the author(s) at the time of publication, and are subject to change without notice.  Information has been derived from sources deemed to be reliable, but the reliability of which is not guaranteed.  Readers are encouraged to obtain official statements and other disclosure documents on their own and/or to consult with their own investment professional and advisors prior to making any investment decisions.

Joseph Krist

Municipal Credit Consultant

We took a couple of weeks off to rest and recharge but it was amazing to see that when we came back the budget lunacy surrounding some of the larger states had continued unabated.

PRASA TESTS THE MARKET

As we go to press, the PR Aqueduct and Sewer Authority will attempt to sell $750 of revenue bonds in the public markets. The bonds have been rated Caa3/CCC-/CC by the three major rating agencies. PRASA has $5.4 billion of debt already outstanding and there are questions about its ability to service its current level of indebtedness. It intends to use the new funding to finance a portion of its capital improvement program through June 30, 2019, reimburse itself for certain capital costs incurred during fiscal years 2013, 2014 and 2015, and repay or refinance certain outstanding credit facilities provided by local banks and the Government Development Bank (GDB).

The fears over the ability to cover debt service and act on a transparent basis will not be eased by the language added to the official statement regarding  future financial disclosure. The Authority says that it intends to provide quarterly reports but that it is not required to. The Bonds will be secured under a gross revenue pledge which is supported by a 2.5 times rate covenant. There is no provision for funding or maintenance of a debt service reserve fund.

Capital requirements will continue to be significant. PRASA currently operates under three existing consent decrees with the US EPA and faces a proposed fourth such decree. PRASA estimates that $1.7 billion of additional capital would be required to meet the terms of the consent decrees.

Another major concern is whether or not PRASA can continue to be seen as insulated from the overall financing and operating difficulties of the Common wealth as a whole. Each of the rating agencies expressed concern regarding this aspect of the PRASA credit. As for the central governments difficulties, the Governor’s office has said that the central government’s cash flow would only generate enough money to operate until November absent any additional deal that brings $400 million to $500 million in much-needed liquidity to the government.

“November continues to be the month when we would go under if we don’t take further actions,” according to the Governor’s chief of staff . He added that the government would take a determination at “some point in September” on whether to move forward with an initiative that seeks to provide the commonwealth with the needed short-term liquidity. “The one being more actively worked on is the exchange of notes at the GDB.”

MET PIER DOWNGRADE

The circus that is the budget dispute in Illinois has claimed yet another credit scalp. S&P lowered its rating on the Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority after the Illinois Legislature did not appropriate the sales tax revenue that is intended to support a monthly payment for debt service. S&P said ” although the statutory construct and bond document provisions historically have insulated these monthly payments — and ultimately debt service payments — from the budget and liquidity pressures occurring at the state level, we now believe this structure is vulnerable to those pressures as they play out in the state budget and appropriations process. The rating action reflects our view that the bonds are, in fact, appropriation obligations of the state, rather than special tax bonds, and are now one notch below our current A minus/Watch Neg general obligation rating on Illinois.”

The action is a blow to bondholders who had traditionally taken comfort from their belief that their bonds were protected from that fiscal machinations of the political process. The long term damage to the state’s credibility is incalculable and should be costly to it going forward.

Ninety percent of what the state usually spends has been authorized despite having no approved budget as of mid-August. according to an  analysis by Senate Democrats. That study shows that if spending continues at this rate, Illinois is on track to spend about $38 billion this year, leading to a $5 billion deficit.

The House revenue committee is holding hearings to try to determine how much the state is spending — something all involved acknowledge is a mystery. Estimates range from $32 billion to $38 billion rate over the current fiscal year. While the failure to enact a full budget has dragged on, dozens of consent decrees issued by federal courts kicked in, mandating Illinois continue to spend money on services like the Department of Children and Family Services and Medicaid. Payments to pension funds, state debt service and tax refunds also are automatically authorized by law. A court order requires the state to continue to pay its employees at their normal salaries.

When and if the two sides do reach a budget deal, they will have to raise taxes, cut spending retroactively or make 12 months’ worth of changes in a condensed time period — making any action more painful and politically difficult.

KANSAS PENSION BONDS

The jury may still be out on whether the Kansas experiment with tax cutting has been a success but one answer may lie in the authorization of $1 billion of bonds to fund payments to the state’s pension funds. It is somewhat amazing that in light of the historically bad experiences of pension bond issuers (New Jersey and Detroit are prime examples) that support for the concept still exists. The well-documented ideological approach to budgeting under taken by the Brownback administration has led the legislature to take the easy way out in its approach to historic pension underfunding in the state. There are enough other issues pressuring the state – especially in the area of education that punting on the pension issue made sense to the legislature.

PENNSYLVANIA BUDGET

There may be a way to resolve the Commonwealth’s budget impasse as Gov. Tom Wolf is said to be open to consideration of a new type of pension benefits plan for future state and public school employees. Called a “stacked hybrid,” the new Wolf plan would maintain the current pension formula – based on a years’  of service and career-ending salary – as a foundation benefit for all employees. But once a person’s income has crossed a certain threshold – Wolf has proposed $100,000, for starters – that plan would max out. Any benefits on income over the cap would be based on a 401(k)-type plan.

It also would expose current state and school employees to higher payroll contribution rates into the retirement systems if the funds’ internal investment targets aren’t met over an extended period of time. The governor also continues to support a $3 billion pension bond issue. Wolf claims annual debt service can be covered by increased profits from Pennsylvania’s state-held liquor monopoly, based on longer operating hours, more Sunday openings and greater price flexibility.

BUILD AMERICA BOND SUBSIDIES CUT

Under the requirements of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, payments to certain state and local government filers applicable to certain qualified bonds are subject to sequestration. This means that refund payments processed on or after October 1, 2015 and on or before September 30, 2016 will be reduced by the fiscal year 2016 sequestration rate of 6.8 percent. The sequestration reduction rate will be applied unless and until a law is enacted that cancels or otherwise impacts the sequester, at which time the sequestration reduction rate is subject to change. These reductions apply to Build America Bonds, Qualified School Construction Bonds, Qualified Zone Academy Bonds, New Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, and Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds. In plain English, the level of subsidies made to each issuer of BABs will be cut 6.8%. Prior cuts have not resulted in any reductions in payments or defaults and we anticipate that will continue to be the case. The irony is that many in Congress support some form of this type of bond support for infrastructure but the ongoing gridlock in Congress over real budget reform is catching the actual level of support for a successful existing program within the confines of its rather wide net.

Disclaimer:  The opinions and statements expressed in this column are solely those of the author, who is solely responsible for the accuracy and completeness of this column.  The opinions and statements expressed on this website are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to provide investment advice or guidance in any way and do not represent a solicitation to buy, sell or hold any of the securities mentioned.  Opinions and statements expressed reflect only the view or judgment of the author(s) at the time of publication, and are subject to change without notice.  Information has been derived from sources deemed to be reliable, but the reliability of which is not guaranteed.  Readers are encouraged to obtain official statements and other disclosure documents on their own and/or to consult with their own investment professional and advisors prior to making any investment decisions.

Joseph Krist

Municipal Credit Consultant

PREPA RESTRUCTURING PLAN

PREPA disclosed that it is seeking to push debt maturities on its $8.1 billion of bonds back by five years, during which time no principal would be paid and interest would be cut to 1%, unless the authority’s cash position warrants it. Those features contrast the more common approach of simply cutting principal and interest payments. Under PREPA’s plan the debt of the forbearing bondholders and the debt of those non-forbearing bondholders who elected for this plan would be subject to what the Commonwealth is calling a moratorium. Non-forbearing bondholders would also have the right to elect to take immediate payments with haircuts from 30 to 35%.

In PREPA’s plan, insured debt would be excluded from these treatments.

The president of the House of Representatives Jaime Perelló said, “We are going to start a dialogue case by case concerning our (the Commonwealth’s direct) debts to see if we can extend their payment by five years,” the same period found in PREPA’s proposal. PREPA made its proposal to its bondholders on June 25, though it was not made public until after Perelló’s comment.

Perelló is one of five members of Puerto Rico’s government sitting on the Working Group for Economic Recovery for Puerto Rico, which is assigned to come up with proposals for restructuring the commonwealth government’s debt by Sept. 1.

One has to turn on the old way back machine to find an example of the kind of fiscal semantics being attempted by PR officials. The last time that this stunt was attempted was by New York in 1975 when it enacted a ‘debt moratorium’. This was seen for the semantic game it was and fooled no one while NY claimed that it had not actually ‘defaulted’ on the debt, they just postponed repayment.

PREPA is the logical candidate for a restructuring as a revenue backed enterprise with a discrete source of revenues for operations and debt service. There could be many reasons for creditors in this scenario to go along with a restructuring of that kind of enterprise. In the case of tax-backed debt like GO’s, the issue is much more difficult as the creditors will potentially viewed as being in direct competition with the provision of essential services.

 COMMONWEALTH CREDITOR DIVIDE

The dimensions of the fault line between creditors and the current administration become clearer this week. Centennial Group Latin America, a consulting firm, based in Washington, was hired several months ago by the group of hedge funds and other investment firms to analyze Puerto Rico’s economy and finances. It produced a study for that group, the Ad Hoc Group, which includes Fir Tree Partners, Brigade Capital Management, Monarch Alternative Capital and Davidson Kempner.

The Ad Hoc Group owns about $5.2 billion of debt, mostly general-obligation bonds and other bonds that are guaranteed by the central government. Economists working for that group say that the government could solve its debt crisis largely by improving tax collections and obtaining additional financing over the next two years. The message of sustainability is in real contrast with the recent announcement by Puerto Rico’s governor, Alejandro García Padilla, that the commonwealth’s debt is “unpayable.”

“There may be an issue of liquidity in the short term,” in Puerto Rico, “but the debt itself, in global terms, is sustainable,” according to the hedge funds’ consultants.  They estimate that Puerto Rico would need short-term financing of about $2.5 billion to get through 2016 safely. That would cover current overdue bills to vendors, scheduled payments on existing debt and finance a budget deficit projected to be less than $500 million.

The economists said they were not suggesting that Puerto Rico ought to impose any more tax increases on residents who were already paying the taxes they owe. The report shows the commonwealth collects far less of the taxes due than the 50 states, and that it would not have to increase tax rates at all if it could capture what residents are now supposed to be paying. The advisers also argued that Puerto Rico could improve its finances by privatizing the operation of its public works. The commonwealth had already contracted with a Mexican firm to operate its largest airport, and privatized of its toll highways.

Some of the hedge fund holders also offered earlier this year to loan Puerto Rico about $2 billion, to help get the commonwealth through another year of its perennial budget shortfalls. But the government declined those offers, saying the terms were too onerous. Víctor Suárez, chief of staff to Gov. García Padilla said, “The simple fact remains that extreme austerity placed on Puerto Ricans with less than a comprehensive effort from all stakeholders is not a viable solution for an economy already on its knees.”

On the funding side, a $2.95 billion bond issue through the Puerto Rico Infrastructure Financing Authority (AFI by its Spanish acronym) will not be pursued at this time, as “there is no market for it,” Suárez said Monday. The deal was intended to repay a $2.2 billion loan that the Government Development Bank (GDB) provided to the Highways & Transportation Authority (HTA), after transferring the loan to AFI. Recent hikes to the petroleum-products tax were legislated to serve as repayment source for the transaction and would have also provided cash for HTA operations.

“We are trying to achieve a smaller transaction, with reasonable terms, of some $400 [million] to $500 million,” according to Suarez. Meanwhile, Puerto Rico is seeking to finalize before mid-August a $400 million TRANs deal from three public corporations in a bid to ease the commonwealth’s current cash crunch. The commonwealth faces a $59.7 million payment on Public Finance Corp. bonds on August 1. We have discussed previously that Puerto Rico would be unable to meet with the current government’s liquidity. The government has reiterated that the priority will always be to provide essential services to citizens, such as security, health and education.

CHICAGO PENSION DECISION

Cook County Judge Rita Novak threw out the pension changes adopted earlier this year by the City of Chicago on Friday. Her decision was based on an earlier Illinois Supreme Court ruling that said similar changes to state pension funds violated the state constitution. The decision was not unanticipated.

The overhaul sought to eliminate a $9.4 billion unfunded pension liability by cutting benefits and increasing contributions. Workers, retirees and labor unions sued, saying the constitution prohibits reducing pension benefits. In a statement Friday, Chicago corporation counsel Stephen Patton says the city is disappointed in the decision. He says the city looks forward to having its arguments heard by the Illinois Supreme Court.

Those arguments include the City’s contention that the City’s changes preserved and protected the funds from the depletion of their assets. It further legally binds the city to actuarially based contributions to fully fund the system, and obligates the city on pension annuities, which the city argued prior statutes did not. The judge said that this argument was “wholly inconsistent with constitutional teachings” saying “it disregards the settled distinction between pension benefits, which are constitutionally protected, and funding choices, which are not.”

Another argument was that the new provisions afforded fund members provide consideration for the cuts, a legal theory in contract law that allows for detrimental changes to be made in exchange for some perk if parties agree. The city notes that 28 of 31 impacted unions signed off on the plan. The judge said that the city failed to show it had authority for such an expansive interpretation of a “bargained-for exchange.” She further found that argument fails in ignoring the individual rights of fund members who are not in the unions that were party to the negotiations.

CA MELLO ROOS DEBT

This month an Orange County Grand Jury released a report that helps investors to understand what analysts face in trying to obtain and follow important credit-related data supporting this important class of largely non-rated debt. Much of this debt is held by individuals and their mutual fund proxies. The review covered only community facilities district debt issued within Orange County. Its findings, however have broad implications for the sector statewide.

The Grand Jury found that there is a significant lack of transparency regarding CFDs. Information pertaining to a CFD that is provided to the homeowner often does not include the intended purposes of the special tax. Administrative costs and servicing costs of the bond are often not openly revealed. It has been suggested to the Grand Jury that the only way to get good information is for the homeowner to request detailed accounting records (internal financial statements) of the CFD-T under the Freedom of Information Act. There is a lack of transparency to homeowners relative to how CFD funds are being used.

The Grand Jury discovered that the State does not require a complete accounting of the use of CFDs. The only information required by the State CDIAC is the original amount of bond funding, bond balance, taxes outstanding to be collected, and the end date of the bonds. There does not seem to be appropriate oversight and auditing of CFDs and special tax expenditures within the County of Orange. While the assumption is that the CFD debt would be repaid in a finite period of time, there is a mechanism available to controlling entities to extend debt obligations and thereby extend the CFD special tax in perpetuity.

The Grand Jury recommended that each local agency that established a CFD should create an oversight committee and an audit committee to provide for an independent, transparent view of the manner in which CFD funds are being expended. Audit report information, as delineated in California Government Code, 1982 § 53343.1, should be made available to the CFD taxpayers on a website after each fiscal year for each CFD number.

TIME FOR VACATION

It’s time to rest and recharge so we will not be publishing in the first two weeks in August.

Disclaimer:  The opinions and statements expressed in this column are solely those of the author, who is solely responsible for the accuracy and completeness of this column.  The opinions and statements expressed on this website are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to provide investment advice or guidance in any way and do not represent a solicitation to buy, sell or hold any of the securities mentioned.  Opinions and statements expressed reflect only the view or judgment of the author(s) at the time of publication, and are subject to change without notice.  Information has been derived from sources deemed to be reliable, but the reliability of which is not guaranteed.  Readers are encouraged to obtain official statements and other disclosure documents on their own and/or to consult with their own investment professional and advisors prior to making any investment decisions.

Joseph Krist

Municipal Credit Consultant

PR ANNUAL APPROPRIATION DEFAULT

The Puerto Rico Public Finance Corporation  failed to make a $93.7 million debt-service payment last Wednesday. The corporation’s bonds are backed by a pledge that the Puerto Rican legislature will appropriate the cash needed to pay them down. But lawmakers did not appropriate the funds as promised. “In accordance with the terms of these bonds, the transfer was not made due to the non-appropriation of funds,” said the Government Development Bank. So far Puerto Rico has been making its scheduled payments on its $13 billion of general-obligation bonds. The move follows by only two days a presentation to investors in which the Commonwealth gave no indication of an impending failure to pay.

It is not a surprise that the Commonwealth would make such a move but it does further diminish the Commonwealth’s credibility in terms of the representations it makes and has made to investors over time. The upcoming debt restructuring negotiations will require mutual good faith to succeed but the Commonwealth seems to be willing to diminish that asset rather quickly. We believe that this move will simply strengthen the demands of investors for strong, binding, outside oversight and that those investors already inclined towards litigation will continue to pursue it.

While technically, the failure to transfer the funds was attributed to the failure by the legislature to appropriate the funds, the government admitted this week that regardless of the legislative action needed to enable the allocation, cash flow is not sufficient today to meet the Aug. 1 payment.

July is an important month for the commonwealth, as an estimated $1.92 billion in payments are due, according to data from the GDB and the Financial Times. These include payments of $630 million in general-obligation (GO) debt service; $415 million from the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority for debt service; $390 million for other GO credits; and $300 million and accrued interest in tax revenue anticipation notes. On July 31, a payment of $92 million for a general fund debt is due.

ORRIN HATCH’S PRIMER ON PR

A letter from Sen. Orrin Hatch of Utah to the U.S. Treasury Secretary included a variety of questions which serve as a good basic primer for individuals interested in the PR debt situation. We offer excerpts from the letter including the questions that the Senator has for the Secretary.

What is the administration’s position on stand-alone proposals to allow Puerto Rico’s government to be treated as a state under chapter 9, including retroactive application to already outstanding indebtedness?

Has the administration given consideration to appointing a special mediator or arbitrator to work with Puerto Rico and its creditors to establish an orderly resolution of a Puerto Rican default?

What is the administration’s position on exempting Puerto Rico from the Jones Act, as recommended in the so-called “Krueger report?”

What is the administration’s position on exempting Puerto Rico from federal minimum wage law, or reducing the level of the federally-imposed minimum wage as President Obama has done in other instances (e.g., delays of scheduled minimum wage increases for American Samoa and for the Northern Mariana Islands), where the President acknowledges that a one-size-fits-all federal minimum wage can be costly to residents in areas where productivity and living costs are well below the national averages?

The government reportedly is “consulting with a group of bankers from Citigroup who advised Detroit on a $1.5 billion debt exchange with certain creditors” and “United States Treasury officials…have been advising the island’s government in recent months amid the worsening fiscal situation.” What advice have Treasury officials been offering to Puerto Rico? Have Treasury officials pledged any federal resources to Puerto Rico in conjunction with the advice, including expediting fund flows from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury to Puerto Rico?

What actions are officials from Treasury’s recently formed Office of State and Local Finance taking with respect to Puerto Rico’s assertion that its debts are not payable? What “potential federal policy responses” have the Office of State and Local Finance at Treasury developed?

Does the administration intend to appoint an official to manage any federal aid packages to Puerto Rico, as was the case when former administration official Don Graves was appointed to manage aid given to Detroit following its filing for bankruptcy?

Do you, as Chair of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), still agree with the assessment in FSOC’s latest annual report that “Despite problems exhibited by Puerto Rico, there has been little spillover thus far to the broader municipal bond market.”? Do you also still agree with the FSOC annual report that notable municipal defaults in recent years, though “severe events,” “appear to be idiosyncratic and not representative of a broader trend in municipal credit?”

Are there any anticipated executive actions under discussion among administration officials with respect to any changes in Treasury rules or regulations that may affect how the federal tax system impacts residents and businesses in Puerto Rico or the flow of transfers from the General Fund of the Treasury to Puerto Rico?

Does the administration intend for its proposed 19 percent minimum tax on foreign income to be applied to Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) operating in Puerto Rico in the same way it would apply to CFCs operating elsewhere?

For over four years, pursuant to Treasury Notice 2011-2, a Puerto Rican excise tax has received treatment from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as though it was eligible for the Foreign Tax Credit. The Notice stated that the excise tax presents new concerns and that “determination of the creditability of the Excise Tax requires the resolution of a number of legal and factual issues.” Until such a resolution, the IRS has not and is not challenging claims as to the creditability of the excise tax. Furthermore, the Notice states that if the IRS eventually decides that the excise tax is not creditable, such a lack of creditability will only apply on a forward-going basis.

1. When will Treasury finish its review to determine the creditability of the excise tax?
2. Are there other examples of Treasury, currently or in the past, allowing a tax to be eligible for Foreign Tax Credit treatment while the tax is under examination?
3. Has Treasury ever announced that, if a tax was determined to not be eligible for the Foreign Tax credit, such a lack of eligibility would apply on a prospective basis?

Many of these items fit the desires of the current administration in PR. At the same time, regardless of the Administration’s position on any or all of these topics, it is not clear that a political consensus exists in Congress to resolve all of these issues in Puerto Rico’s favor.

In the meantime, the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation approved an  extenders bill which would extend through the end of 2016 two Puerto Rico-related tax provisions. One provision would temporarily increase the limit on the amount of excise taxes on rum that are distributed to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Under the bill, the territories would be able to receive $13.25 rather than $10.50 per proof gallon. The JCT estimated that extending this provision would lead to federal outlays of $336 million over ten years. The other provision would allow a domestic production activities deduction to be applied to activities in Puerto Rico. Under current law, special domestic production activities rules for the commonwealth apply for the first nine years of a taxpayer beginning after Dec. 31, 2005 and before Jan. 1, 2015. Under the bill, the rules would apply for the first eleven years of a taxpayer beginning after Dec. 31, 2005 and before Jan. 1, 2017.

CA BANKRUPTCY LAW

California Gov. Jerry Brown has signed a new law securing revenues for general obligation bonds issued by local governments — a law intended to protect bondholders in a bankruptcy proceeding. The law – SB 222 – is designed to preserve bondholder rights to the tax revenues used to back bonds, which are received by a municipality after it enters bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy code defines statutory liens like those mandated under SB 222 as created by force of law, as opposed to consensual liens that are created by an agreement. “Secured” creditors of a bankrupt municipality are supposed to be first in line to recover their money, but California law was previously silent on whether local GOs were “secured” for that purpose. The new law addresses that ambiguity.

The need for the law would seem to pose somewhat of a dilemma for those who had previously expressed certainty that the statutory lien for voted GO debt had already been established. The attorney who drafted the law said “many have argued that the taxes levied to pay California GO bonds are ‘special revenues’ under the bankruptcy code, but this analysis has never been certain. This is the first time we have been able to say that GO bondholders are secured creditors in a municipal bankruptcy. Being a secured creditor in bankruptcy dramatically decreases the risk of nonpayment. This newfound certainty should permit investors and rating agencies to focus more narrowly on the tax-base as the credit for California GO bonds, and less heavily on issuers’ general funds.”

The new law, which becomes effective on Jan. 1, is very similar to legislation enacted in Rhode Island in 2011 after Central Falls filed for Chapter 9 protection.

Moody’s Investors Service said “Generally speaking, the security for California local government GO bonds is a dedicated, unlimited, voter-approved property tax levy, the proceeds of which cannot be used for any purpose other than the bonds authorized by voters. The California Constitution makes the debt service levy separate from the property tax levied for operating purposes. State statute is nonetheless silent on whether GO investors would be secured in the event of a local government’s bankruptcy filing, and case law on this matter is also very limited. The new law is positive for GO investors because it clearly establishes their secured status.” However, it said it would not likely have a “material effect” on the ratings of California local GOs.

Fitch Ratings took a different view saying “revenues supported by a statutory lien are not free from the automatic stay of a municipality’s general revenues once bankruptcy proceedings begin.  Rather, the statutory lien prevents the municipality in a bankruptcy from generally diverting the revenues subject to the statutory lien. The statutory lien does not prevent use of the revenues in the bankruptcy process as long as adequate protection for recovery is offered to bondholders benefiting from the statutory lien. These protections will not guarantee full or timely repayment, only potentially higher recovery.”

PROVIDENCE CONSIDERS OUTDOOR SMOKING BAN

Rhode Island’s capital city is considering a law to prohibit smoking throughout the downtown, a ban that an advocacy group says is the most wide-reaching one it’s seen. The ban would improve the quality of life for residents and visitors, according to proponents, but some business owners are concerned it could actually drive away customers. The state was one of the early issuers of tobacco securitization debt.

The proposed law would cover non-enclosed sidewalks and other pedestrian areas, including alleys, that are accessible to the public anywhere in downtown Providence. Smoking would only be allowed in private residences and vehicles. Smokers who break the law could be fined up to $250. The city banned smoking indoors in businesses including bars and restaurants in 2005. The Providence smoking ban would cover more area and prohibit smoking in all of downtown, an area that is defined by the city as about one square mile. Public hearings could begin in September.

Disclaimer:  The opinions and statements expressed in this column are solely those of the author, who is solely responsible for the accuracy and completeness of this column.  The opinions and statements expressed on this website are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to provide investment advice or guidance in any way and do not represent a solicitation to buy, sell or hold any of the securities mentioned.  Opinions and statements expressed reflect only the view or judgment of the author(s) at the time of publication, and are subject to change without notice.  Information has been derived from sources deemed to be reliable, but the reliability of which is not guaranteed.  Readers are encouraged to obtain official statements and other disclosure documents on their own and/or to consult with their own investment professional and advisors prior to making any investment decisions.

Joseph Krist

Municipal Credit Consultant

PUERTO RICO

Puerto Rico Gov. Alejandro García Padilla signed legislation allowing the government to suspend general obligation bond set-asides early in the fiscal year and requiring the government to address deficits as they develop. A 1976 law required the government to set aside a proportionate amount of upcoming interest and principal coming due. The bill signed Friday overturns this law. The bill also will allow the government to borrow about $400 million from three commonwealth-run insurance funds. The State Insurance Fund, the Administration for Compensating for Automobile Accidents, and the Insurance Fund for Temporary Non-occupational Incapacity will lend the money.

Most of Puerto Rico’s revenues come in late in the fiscal year, which has required the government to issue short-term debt at the start of the fiscal year and pay it off near the end of the year.

The legislation would seem to conflict with the Puerto Rico Constitution. Article VI, section 8 of the Puerto Rico constitution reads, “In case the available revenues including surplus for any fiscal year are insufficient to meet the appropriations made for that year, interest on the public debt and amortization thereof shall first be paid, and other disbursements shall thereafter be made in accordance with the order of priorities established by law.” The Governor’s office however took the stance that “the suspension of these deposits does not imply a breach with the bondholders on the date of payment,”.

Puerto Rico House of Representatives Treasury and Budget Committee Chairman Rafael Hernández Montañez contends that the government will only stop the set-asides if it cannot borrow the $1.2 billion in intra-year funding or the Puerto Rico Infrastructure and Finance Authority cannot sell a $2.9 billion gas-tax supported bond which seems to be the current case.

The new law also requires the government use its normal reserves and set up a separate budget reserve at the GDB. In this way the amount in reserve can be more easily monitored. The law requires that if the reserve is drawn on, steps be taken to replenish it.

The Commonwealth followed up the legislative action with an investor meeting at the beginning of this week. It was, in many ways, the opening act in a long but predictable play. As is often the case, the presentation was obvious and unfulfilling in that it really was just a presentation of known facts rather than a framework for action. In many ways it continues a tradition of uninformative presentations which have become an unfortunate hallmark of the Commonwealth’s management of its credit relations. Nevertheless, it did serve to reiterate some things which have been clear for some time.

On the positive side, the Commonwealth denies that it is looking for direct Federal monetary aid. That would at least show a degree of realism about the appetite in Washington for direct fiscal aid. It wasn’t available for Detroit so there is no reason to suspect that it would be there for Puerto Rico. The need to get its own fiscal house in order as well as the need for some level of investor-accepted oversight was acknowledged. In addition, it was clear that the need for structural economic reform in the form of a more productive and legitimate economic structure was emphasized.

On the negative side, it appears that the Commonwealth is looking for debt relief over an extended period – at this point some 8 years. In addition, it is obvious that the Commonwealth ties serious reforms of the government employment and compensation structure to a haircut for creditors. While it seemed to acknowledge the contradiction between not meeting its constitutional and contractual commitments and market access, the Commonwealth gave no indication that it had managed to reconcile these opposing interests.

On the subject of restructuring, the Commonwealth tried to emphasize the voluntary nature of restructuring but also reiterated support for H.R. 870 authorizing Puerto Rico municipalities to declare bankruptcy under Chapter 9. Sens. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., and Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn. introduced companion legislation to H.R. 870 as we go to press. The emphasis on partnership, transparency, and all of the other current terms of art as well as references to Greece were not reassuring. The Commonwealth did all it could to encourage a quick resolution (obviously) and positioned itself to blame creditors if a protracted negotiation impeded economic recovery.

The reliance on economic recovery as a source of resources for repayment of debt going forward is no surprise. At the same time, the Kruger Report does lay out how many competitive forces work against Puerto Rico. The emphasis on lower wage costs to attract business could be argued to be a race to the bottom as many lower wage base competitors exist in the Caribbean. Some are better located relative to end markets. And left unsaid in any of the discussions are potential long-term competition from Cuba – effectively an 800 pound gorilla in the room.

We see restructuring and relief as the answers for the Commonwealth rather than reliance on stronger revenues. That implies a protracted negotiation over the terms of debt relief and we believe that there are sufficient differences between the needs of the different creditor groups to indicate a longer rather than shorter process. We also believe that the current stance of the Commonwealth may drive some creditors to legally test the constitutional and contractual supports for the various types of Commonwealth debt. We believe that those tests will occur in or out of bankruptcy.

PREPA, which is already underway with its restructuring, has been trying to achieve it for a year now. As for PRASA, the Commonwealth expressed belief that a rate increase would allow its current debt structure to be supported. That may not be realistic in terms of historic resistance to increases and the drought conditions which are impacting current usage. For 160,000 residents and businesses on the island, currently water is turned off for 48 hours and then back on for 24 hours, sending people into a frenzy of water collection. Another 185,000 are going without water in 24-hour cycles, and 10,000 are on a 12-hour rationing plan. 340,000 households and businesses — about 28 percent of the island’s total — in 13 municipalities are at times going without water.

PENSIONS

The Pew Charitable Trusts have released their latest view of the nation’s pension crisis. According to Pew, the nation’s state-run retirement systems had a $968 billion shortfall in 2013 between pension benefits that governments have promised to their workers and the funding available to meet those obligations—a $54 billion increase from the previous year. In 2013, state pension contributions totaled $74 billion—$18 billion short of what was needed to meet the ARC—with only 24 states setting aside at least 95 percent of the ARC they determined for themselves. Illinois continues to have the lowest funding ratio followed by Kentucky and Connecticut at under 50%. Other laggards below 60% include Alaska, Rhode Island, Louisiana, Mississippi, and New Hampshire. New Jersey, a well known pension defunder has seen its funding ratio drop from 68% to 63% in the last two years.

Disclaimer:  The opinions and statements expressed in this column are solely those of the author, who is solely responsible for the accuracy and completeness of this column.  The opinions and statements expressed on this website are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to provide investment advice or guidance in any way and do not represent a solicitation to buy, sell or hold any of the securities mentioned.  Opinions and statements expressed reflect only the view or judgment of the author(s) at the time of publication, and are subject to change without notice.  Information has been derived from sources deemed to be reliable, but the reliability of which is not guaranteed.  Readers are encouraged to obtain official statements and other disclosure documents on their own and/or to consult with their own investment professional and advisors prior to making any investment decisions.